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BEYOND "SELLOUTS" AND "RACE CARDS": 
BLACK ATTORNEYS AND THE 
STRAITJACKET OF LEGAL PRACTICE 
Margaret M. Russell* 
J. INTRODUCTION: REPRESENTING RACE 
For attorneys of color, the concept of "representing race" within 
the context of everyday legal practice is neither new nor voluntarily 
learned; at a basic level, it is what we do whenever we enter a court­
room or conference room in the predominantly white legal system 
of this country. The ineluctable visibility of racial minorities in the 
legal profession, as well as the often unspoken but nevertheless 
deeply felt sense of racially hierarchical positioning to which this 
visibility subjects us, are aptly expressed in the following droll rec­
ollection of a 1960s-era Black civil rights lawyer: 
A favorite story among Southern black attorneys was of the black 
lawyer who was to argue a case before the Mississippi Supreme Court. 
He had prepared his briefs with great precision and scholarship, and 
was quite confident that the law was in favor of his client - that is, as 
confident as a black lawyer can be in a �outhern court. However, in 
his concentration on the law, he had neglected to look up the proper 
way to address the Supreme Court before beginning his argument. A 
stylized, formal address is always used in speaking to an appellate 
court, differing from court to court, but it's usually some variation of 
"May it please the distinguished Chief Justice and the distinguished 
Associate Justices of this Honorable Court." Being forced to call 
upon his instinct for an improvised form of address, he arose, looked 
up and down the bench, and said, "Good morning, white folks." His 
brief could not have stated the issue of the case more realistically and 
precisely than this spontaneous greeting.1 
Although it is often assumed that people of color initiate or 
even "instigate". extemporaneous comments about race in legal pro-
* Associate Professor of Law, Santa Clara University School of Law; A.B. 1979, 
Princeton; J.D. 1984, J.S.M. 1990, Stanford. - Ed. I am grateful to Margalynne Annstrong, 
Naomi Cahn, Ellen Kreitzberg, and Gerald Uelmen for reading an earlier draft of this essay; 
to June Carlbone for especially detailed commentary; to Stephanie Mirande for expert re­
search assistance; and to Lee Haltennan for all-encompassing support. 
1. Edward A. Dawley, Black People Don't Have Legal Problems, Address at the Tom 
Paine Summer Law School (summer 1970), in THE RELEVANT LAWYERS: CONVERSATIONS 
OUT OF CoURT ON THEIR CUENTS, THEIR PRACTICE, THEIR POLITICS, THEIR LIFE STYLE 
219, 220-21 (Ann Fagan Ginger ed., 1972) [hereinafter THE RELEVANT LAWYERS]. 
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ceedings, the reality is that many people of color - like.the Black 
lawyer in the tale above - simply articulate a subtext that is un­
mentioned but obvious: that their minority racial presence is forced 
into stark and distorted relief against an otherwise seemingly 
"transparent" background of white omnipresence.2 Attorneys of 
color often find that they are identified, categorized, and evaluated 
first as members of their racial group, and only secondarily - if at 
all - as lawyers. In this sense, "representing race" is a fundamen­
tal and inescapable part of minority attorneys' professional identity 
and political function as marginalized actors in the mainstream 
legal system, quite apart from and transcendent of the particulars of 
individual client representation. As suggested above, this phenom­
enon derives its salience from two factors: the paucity of people of 
color in the legal profession;3 and the debasing and racially prejudi­
cial slights to which they are subjected on a recurrent basis.4 
Regarding the first factor, minority attorneys still suffer from 
severe underrepresentation in the legal profession. At the begin­
ning of this decade, Blacks, Asian Americans, Latinos and Latinas, 
and Native Americans comprised only twelve percent of the 
2. Barbara Flagg defines "transparency" as the proclivity of whites to think of themselves 
as "raceless" unless they are in situations in which juxtaposition with people of color renders 
racial differences obvious: "The most striking characteristic of whites' consciousness of 
whiteness is that most of the time we don't have any. I call this the transparency phenome­
non: the tendency of whites not to think about whiteness, or about norms, behaviors, exper­
iences, or perspectives that are white-specific." Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind, But Now I 
See": White Race Consciousness and the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. 
REv. 953, 957 (1993} [hereinafter Flagg, Was Blind]; see also Barbara J. Flagg, Fashioning a 
Title VII Remedy for Transparently White Subjective Decisionmaking, 104 YALE L.J. 2009, 
2013 (1995) [hereinafter Flagg, Fashioning a Title VII Remedy]. For an extended application 
of the concept of transparency to the historical and legal construction of white racial identity, 
see IAN F. HANEY L6PEZ, WHrrE BY LAw: THE LEGAL CoNsTRucnoN OF RACE (1996). 
3. See generally TASK FORCE ON MINORITIES IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION, A.B.A., RE­
PORT WITii RECOMMENDATIONS (1986) (recommending adoption by the ABA of policies to 
integrate the legal profession and create more opportunities for Ininority lawyers); Ramsey 
Campbell, State's Legal System Lacks Minorities, Commission Says; Racial and Ethnic Bias 
Study Concludes Underrepresentation Has Created an Unfair System, ORLANDO SENTINEL 
TRIB., Nov. 14, 1991, at Dl; Rita Henley Jensen, Minorities Didn't Share in Firm Growth, 
NATL LJ., Feb. 19, 1990, at 1; Steven Keeva, Unequal Partners: It's Tough at the Top for 
Minority Lawyers, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1993, at 50; Alexander Stille, Little Room at the Top for 
Blacks, Hispanics; Outlook Better for Women, Asians, NATL. L.J., Dec. 23, 1985, at 1; Doreen 
Weisenhaus, Still a Long Way to Go for Women, Minorities: White Males Dominate Firms, 
NATL L.J., Feb. 8, 1988, at 1. Racial exclusion is revealed by not only the number of practic­
ing lawyers, but of law faculty and law students as well. See, e.g., Minority Women Lagging in 
Law Faculties, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1992, at A19; Saundra Torry, At Yale Law, a Gender Gap 
in Who Gets Clerkships Sparks Debate, WASH. Posr, May 13, 1991, at F5 (reporting on gen­
der and race disparities in the selection of Jaw students for clerkships). 
4. See generally Claudia MacLachlan, Legal Bias: Attorneys See Discriminatiolz, ST. 
Loms Posr-DISPATCH, Dec. 3, 1989, at El; David Margolick, Bar Group Is Told of Racial 
Barriers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1985, at 15; Lena Williams, For the Black Professional, the 
Obstacles Remain, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 1987, at A16; Jeannie Wong, Panel Hears How Mi­
norities See Court System, SACRAMENTO BEE, Apr. 11, 1992, at Bl. 
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nation's law students, less than eight percent of lawyers, eight per­
cent of law professors, and two percent of the partners at the na­
tion's largest law firms.5 When compared with the overall 
percentage of people of color in the national population - approxi­
mately twenty-five percent6 - these paltry figures illustrate the ex­
tent to which attorneys of color are still very much a token presence 
in the legal system.7 Worse still, this phenomenon doubly exacer­
bates the conditions of isolation experienced by minority lawyers, 
because their numbers are just high enough to undermine claims of 
white racial exclusivity in the profession, yet far too low to facilitate 
the comforting sense of belonging or even anonymity that attaches 
quite naturally to white lawyers.8 
The double bind that tokenization imposes on minority attor­
neys is the pressure to comport themselves generally as though the 
legal profession is integrated, colorblind, and even raceless, yet to 
take on the burdens - gratefully! - of role-modeling and other­
wise representing their race on the occasional race commission or 
diversity committee instituted by their colleagues to manifest con­
cern for the plight of minorities. Thus, minority attorneys, even 
while expressing their desire to volunteer to assist communities of 
color within and outside the legal profession, sometimes complain 
that they are somehow expected "naturally" to take on the emo­
tional and temporal demands of extra "race work" as though 
5. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY: ETHICS BY THE PERVASIVE 
MEntoD 53-54 (1994) (citing Jensen, supra note 3, at 1). 
6. See RHODE, supra note 5, at 53. 
7. See Jensen, supra note 3, at 28-29. 
8. Invoking her everyday personal experiences as a white woman, Peggy Mcintosh attrib-
utes this sense of ease to white privilege, which she describes as 
an invisible package of unearned assets that I can count on cashing in each day, but 
about which I was "meant" to remain oblivious. White privilege is like an invisible 
weightless knapsack of special provisions, maps, passports, codebooks, visas, clothes, 
tools, and blank checks. 
Peggy Mcintosh, Unpacking the Invisible Knapsack: White Privilege, CREATION SPIRITUAL­
ITY, Jan./Feb. 1992, at 33. For additional recent works advancing a theoretical critique of 
white privilege and its effects on legal and social relations, see CRmCAL WHITE STUmes: 
LooKING BEHIND THE MIRROR (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., forthcoming 1997); 
L6PEZ, supra note 2; STEPHANIE M. WILDMAN ET AL., PRIVILEGE REVEALED: How lNVISI· 
BLE PRIVILEGE UNDERMINES AMERICA (1996); Adrienne D. Davis, Identity Notes Part One: 
Playing in the Light, 45 AM. U. L. REv. 695 (1996); Flagg, Fashioning a Title VII Remedy, 
supra note 2; Flagg, Was Blind, supra note 2; Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 
HARv. L. REv. 1709 (1993); Martha R. Mahoney, Segregation, Whiteness, and Transforma­
tion, 143 PENN. L. REv. 1659 (1995); Martha R. Mahoney, Whiteness and Women, In Practice 
and Theory: A Reply to Catharine MacKinnon, 5 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 217 {1993); David 
Benjamin Oppenheimer, Understanding Affirmative Action, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 921, 
946-95 {1996). 
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it were the responsibility solely of nonwhites to eradicate 
discrimination.9 
If tokenization represents the first set of problems confronting 
minority attorneys, a second set of obstacles may be attributed to 
the daily, unrelenting mistreatment to which many nlinority attor­
neys are subjected. Attorneys of color often find their everyday 
professional and personal encounters peppered with reminders of 
their minority status in the legal system.10 For example, the New 
York Judicial Commission on Minorities found that fourteen per­
cent of its surveyed litigators asserted that judges, lawyers, or court­
room personnel publicly repeat ethnic jokes, use racial epithets, or 
make demeaning remarks about a minority group "often" or "very 
often"; another twenty-three percent sta�ed that such comments oc­
cur "sometimes."11 Moreover, minorities in the legal profession re­
port anecdotally that outside the legal setting - for example, in 
pursuing such mundane tasks as hailing taxis,12 boarding eleva­
tors,13 shopping for clothes,14 or driving down the street1s - they 
9. On the burdens of "race work," see Richard Delgado, Affirmative Action as a 
Majoritarian Device: Or, Do You Really Want To Be a Role Model?, 89 MICH. L. REv. 1222, 
1226-27 (1991). Delgado writes: 
Suppose you saw a large sign saying, "ROLE MODEL WANTED. GOOD PAY. 
INQUIRE WITHIN." Would you apply? Let me give you five reasons you should not. 
Reason Number One. Being a role model is a tough job, with long hours and much 
heavy lifting. You are expected to uplift your entire people. Talk about hard, sweaty 
work! 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
10. A common complaint among minority attorneys is that in legal proceedings they are 
often presumed to be nonattorneys, e.g., criminal defendants, bailiffs, spectators, or - if 
female - court reporters or parties' wives. See, e.g., Editorial, N.J. HERALD & NEws, Sept. 
16, 1991, at A4, quoted in RHODE, supra note 5, at 125 n.36 (" 'I 'll come into the courtroom 
wearing a $500 suit with a legal folder full of briefs under my arm and the courtroom official 
or guard will order me into the defendant's chair,' said Newark attorney Robert L. Brown, a 
black man. 'They just assume automatically that if you're black, you're the one on trial.' "). 
11. See Arthur S. Hays & Arny Stevens, Racism Is Said to Pervade New York Courts, 
WALL ST. J., June 5, 1991, at B6. 
12. "Taxi stories" - describing the inability to hail a cab because of the cab driver's 
trepidation of the would-be passenger's skin color - are prevalent in the experiences of 
urban professionals of color, particularly Black males. The taxi story even entered the ranks 
of Hollywood movie mythology in the legal thriller The Pelican Brief, in which the swash­
buckling hero played by Denzel Washington is stymied in his efforts to chase down an investi­
gative lead because he cannot hail a taxi on the street in Washington, D.C. See also HENRY 
Loms GATES, JR., LoosE CANONS: NoTES ON nm CULTURE WARS 147 (1992); CoRNEL 
WEST, RAcE MATIERS, at ix-xvi (1993). 
13. See Taunya Lovell Banks, Two Life Stories: Reflections of One Black Woman Law 
Professor, 6 BERKELEY WoMEN's L.J. 46, 49-51 (1991) (describing two white women's refusal 
to board an elevator in a "luxury condominium" with "five well-dressed Black women in 
their thirties and forties"); Peggy C. Davis, Law as Mzcroaggression, 98 YALE L.J. 1559, 1560-
61 (1989) (recounting a white female passenger's ridicule of a Black woman waiting to board 
the elevator). 
14. See PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 44-51 (1991) 
(chronicling the author's exclusion from Benetton, a chic clothing store). 
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are visually "sized up" according to their color rather than the ac­
coutrements of upper-middle-class professional status that they 
thought might insulate them from suspicion.16 The debilitating, lin­
gering effects of such routine and recurrent degrading treatment 
should not be underestimated as significant influences in the forma­
tion of professional identity. Most attorneys of color are forced to 
invoke the prevailing lawyerly ethos of becoming thick-skinned and 
detached - that is, if they hope to remain in the profession with 
their sanity and composure reasonably intact. This response, com­
bined with other age-old survival mechanisms used by people of 
color trapped in racist environments, usually helps render everyday 
interactions tolerable. But it would be naive to assume that the 
above factors - tokenization and everyday, microaggressive har­
assment - do not exert a profound and destabilizing impact upon 
minority lawyers' conceptions of professionalism, attorney-client in­
teraction, case selection, lawyering strategy, courtroom behavior, 
and a host of other concerns. For women of color in the legal pro­
fession, gender bias further exacerbates the burdens of "high visibil­
ity, few mentors and role models, and additional counseling and 
committee responsibilities."17 Although research literature infre­
quently addresses the particular obstacles faced by those also dis­
criminated against on the basis of sexual orientation or disability, 
one might well imagine the inhibitory effects of those factors as 
well. 
Therefore, when a symposium such as this focuses much-needed 
scholarly attention on the possible intersections of critical theory 
and progressive practice with respect to the representation of race 
in the legal process, it is crucial to keep in mind that attorneys of 
color bring vastly different experiences from those of white attor-
15. See Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice 
System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 691 n.76 (1995) (quoting Henry L. Gates, Jr., Thirteen Ways of 
Looking At A Black Man, NEW YORKER, Oct. 23, 1995, at 56, 58 (relating common exper­
iences of prominent Black men who have been subjected to vehicle stops by the police and 
noting that "Blacks - in particular, black men - swap their [negative] experiences of police 
encounters like war stories, and there are few who don't have more than one story to tell • • . •  
There's a moving violation that many African-Americans know as D.W.B.: Driving While 
Black")). 
16. Sadly, the tacit acknowledgement of class hierarchy in the telling of these tales is as 
lamentable as are the lessons of racial bias. What, one wonders, do these anecdotes reveal 
about assumptions made regarding the humanity of people of color who could never afford 
to take cabs, shop at upscale stores, dine in swanky restaurants, or drive BMWs? 
17. Deborah L. Rhode, Perspectives on Professional Women, 40 STAN. L. REv. 1163, 1191 
(1988). Few sources document the unique biases faced by women of color in the legal profes­
sion. For compelling accounts of the personal experiences of Black women in legal educa­
tion, see generally Black Women Law Professors: Building a Community at the Intersection 
of Race and Gender, a Symposium, 6 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1990-91). 
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neys to the underlying issues at hand. Regardless of which specialty 
or career path within the legal profession minority attorneys 
choose, they face a distinctly different set of obstacles than do 
whites, particularly in cases potentially involving racial issues. 
Although recent scholarship in lawyering theory has been quite illu­
minating in exploring a broad array of themes concerning the so­
cially constructed nature of client identity and lawyer identity in 
progressive practice, the role of race in these constructions deserves 
greater attention.1s 
In this essay, I focus on some of the pressures and constraints 
faced by Black attorneys in particular when addressing issues of 
race in legal proceedings.19 I argue that when issues of race are at 
least arguably relevant factors in a case, Black attorneys face an 
unduly restrictive set of choices, each of which carries impossible 
burdens. Saddled with the tacit professional expectation of being 
responsible for identifying, fixing, or rationalizing away race 
problems outside the courtroom, Black attorneys who raise such 
concerns in court often face a heavy burden of justifying either that 
race really exists as an issue at all, or that they are competent to 
address the topic of race in a fair and reasoned manner. When 
Black attorneys articulate racism as a primary factor in a particular 
case, they may encounter fractious demands that they "prove it," or 
harsh accusations that they are "playing the race card" or otherwise 
engaging in unprofessional behavior. Conversely, when Black at­
torneys take on advocacy obligations that require the subordination 
and decontextualization of issues of race in the service of other 
18. Recent articles exploring these concerns include Anthony V .  Alfieri, Defending Ra­
cial Violence, 95 CoLUM. L. REv. 1301 (1995); Bill Ong Hing, Raising Personal Identification 
Issues of Class, Race, Ethnicity, Gender, Sexual Orientation, Physical Disability, and Age in 
Lawyering Courses, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1807 (1993); Michelle S. Jacobs, Legitimacy and the 
Power Game, 1 CuNICAL L. REv. 187 (1994); Symposium, Political Lawyering: Conversa­
tions on Progressive Social Change, 31 HAR.v. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 285 (1996); David B. Wil­
kins, Race, Ethics, and the First Amendment: Should a Black Lawyer Represent the Ku Klux 
Klan?, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1030 (1995); David B. Wtlkins, Two Paths to the 
Mountaintop? The Role of Legal Education in Shaping the Values of Black Corporate Law­
yers, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1981 (1993). 
19. Some of the observations expressed in this article about the quandaries faced by 
Black lawyers might be applied to lawyers of minority-group status generally. However, the 
Darden-Cochran conflict - and the set of race and legal practice issues that it embodies -
strikes me as particularly emblematic of burdens specifically faced by Black lawyers because 
of the culturally distinct set of stereotypes endured by Blacks. In using expansive terms such 
as "Black lawyers" and "Black communities," I am of course mindful of the diversity of 
backgrounds and viewpoints that these labels necessarily include. 
I also acknowledge that within the community of Black attorneys, other factors (e.g., 
gender and sexual orientation) signify other salient differences in experiences and perspec­
tives. This article posits that the problems discussed herein apply to Black attorneys gener­
ally, without delving into those additional dimensions. 
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objectives, they may be labeled as "sellouts" who have abandoned 
their communities. Whatever the choice, the focus of such cases 
inevitably becomes not just race, but their race and their lawyerly 
merits as well. Unlike white attorneys, who have the relatively lux­
urious comfort of invisibility and transparency in raising issues of 
race in the lawyering process, Black attorneys must always brace 
themselves to have their racial, professional, and personal identities 
placed in issue as well. This additional layer of scrutiny and suspi­
cion may in tum raise for the Black attorney difficult professional 
and personal questions of identity, autonomy, authenticity, and loy­
alty. Unless, as suggested above, Black attorneys steel themselves 
mentally and emotionally for the extra demands of race work in a 
legal system that still operates on the unspoken assumption that fix­
ing race problems is naturally the work of minorities, they are des­
tined to lead professional lives of fatigue, frustration, and perhaps 
exploitation.20 This in tum significantly undermines the social­
justice imperatives that lead public-spirited Blacks - whether in 
the private or public sectors - to select law as a career path in the 
first place. 
Thus, I argue, Black attorneys encounter not only a glass ceiling 
barring their vertical and hierarchical career advancement, but a 
type of glass bubble as well that severely circumscribes the flexibil­
ity and creativity so critical to the Black lawyer's - or indeed any 
lawyer's - professional identity. Stereotypical, externally imposed 
assumptions about the role and function of Black attorneys have 
the powerful effect of straitjacketing and asphyxiating Blacks in an 
already highly restrictive environment. While it is important for 
Black lawyers - like other lawyers - to subject themselves to rig­
orous critique regarding the political and societal implications of 
their career choices and professional behavior, I am wary of the 
strong tendency of mainstream popular and legal discourses to find 
ways to castigate Black attorneys for problems essentially not of 
their creation. Thus, in evaluating the microcosm of Black legal 
practice, it is essential to locate it within its macrocosm of con­
structed racial meaning. The Black attorney generally is not ac­
corded the respect, autonomy, or even anonymity enjoyed by her 
white colleagues, and she is therefore doubly disadvantaged by the 
imposition of careerist pigeonholes and expectations. 
20. For a report on the enervating effects of tokenism on minority law professors, see 
generally Roy L. Brooks, Life After Tenure: Can Minority Law Professors Avoid the Clyde 
Ferguson Syndrome?, 20 U.S.F. L. REV. 419 (1986); Richard Delgado, Minority Law Prof es· 
sors' Lives: The Bell-Delgado Survey, 24 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 349 {1989). 
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To illustrate the straitjacketing that I suggest is quite typical in 
the life of the Black attorney, I draw upon a seemingly atypical ex­
ample: public commentary on the work of two prominent and now 
infamous Black attorneys - prosecutor Christopher Darden and 
defense attorney Johnnie Cochran in the murder prosecution of 
O.J. Simpson. Because of the ubiquity of media coverage of the 
trial - including the melodramatic effect of cameras in the court­
room - Cochran and Darden rapidly became two of the most rec­
ognizable Black lawyers in this nation's history. Only the televised 
confrontation of Clarence Thomas and Anita Hill has exposed 
Black attorneys so intensely to the voyeuristic scrutiny of the 
American television-viewing public.21 Yet, a closer examination of 
public attitudes toward Darden and Cochran reveals patterns quite 
common in the treatment of Black lawyers generally. 
Public (including media) reaction to the lawyering styles of 
these two men in the so-called "Trial of the Century"22 exemplifies 
what I describe below as the " 'Sellout' vs. 'Race Card' " trope: 
when issues of race are even potentially relevant in a particular 
case, Black attorneys are cabined within a false dichotomy of op­
tions that implicate not just questions of lawyering strategy, but 
public generalizations about their racial identities and professional 
skills as well. The dichotomy is false because its components have 
been erroneously constructed as opposites: (1) claiming the irrele­
vance of race, or perhaps even denying so vehemently that racism is 
at issue that one is branded an "assimilationist" or "sellout;" versus 
(2) raising racism as an issue, thereby risking accusations that one is 
recklessly "playing the race card" and pandering to racial tensions. 
In my view, this putative oppositeness is a construct that ob­
scures the complexity of the value and strategy choices faced by 
Black attorneys in several ways. First, in the metanarrative or 
"master narrative"23 of a predominantly white legal system, this 
21. On the popular cultural mythology engendered by the Hill-Thomas hearings, see 
Anna Deavere Smith, The Most Riveting Television: The Hill-Thomas Hearings and Popular 
Culture, in RACE, GENDER AND POWER IN AMERICA: THE LEGACY OF 'IHE HILL-THOMAS 
HEARINGS 248 (Anita Faye Hill & Emma Coleman Jordan eds., 1995). 
22. Gerald F. Uelmen wryly notes that his research "has uncovered at least thirty-two 
trials since 1900 that have been called a 'trial of the century.' " GERALD F. UELMEN, LES­
SONS FROM 'IHE TRIAL: THE PEOPLE V. 0.J. S!MPSON204 (1996). 
23. See Lisa Lowe, Heterogeneity, Hybridity, Multiplicity: Marking Asian American Dif­
ferences, 1 DIASPORA 24, 26 (1991) (discussing the role of metanarratives or "master narra­
tives" in imposing "minority" cultural identity upon Asian Americans). In discussing the role 
of media discourses in sharpening tensions between African Americans and Korean Ameri­
cans in the wake of the acquittal of the police officers in the first "Rodney King" trial, Lisa 
Ikemoto observes: "I use 'master narrative' to describe white supremacy's prescriptive, con­
flict-constructing power, which deploys exclusionary concepts of race and privilege in ways 
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false construction of opposites serves the backlash function of fo­
cusing attention on microcosms of intraracial conflict and public 
criticisms of individual Black attorneys, rather than on the more 
noxious legal and social contexts in which they operate. Second, it 
straitjackets Black attorneys by stereotyping and unnecessarily re­
stricting their choices of potential advocacy strategies. Finally, the 
hyperbole surrounding the false dichotomy mischaracterizes the 
meaning of community affiliation and racial identification to many 
Black attorneys who are engaged in an ongoing struggle to be 
viewed not as racial icons, but as real-life, three-dimensional human 
beings. 
Accordingly, this essay addresses the "Sellout"-"Race Card" 
quandary in the following manner: Part II briefly sets forth as illus­
trative the experiences of an earlier generation of Black attorneys 
who faced overt challenges to their professional competence based 
solely on their identities and experiences as Blacks. Part III de­
scribes the "sellout" and "race card" tropes as used against Darden 
and Cochran, respectively, in the Simpson case; I use these terms to 
epitomize the constraints faced by Black attorneys as they struggle 
through complex questions of race within the context of individual 
cases. I conclude by urging Black attorneys to resist such straitjack­
eting, particularly in the service of progressive antisubordination 
lawyering strategies. 
Given the almost overwhelming degree of fascination with the 
O.J. Simpson case, its cultural and intellectual implications, and its 
variable symbolic values,24 one major caveat bears mention and re­
iteration: this is not an essay about the merits of the Simpson 
case,zs nor about the personal characters or legal talents of Christo-
that maintain intergroup conflict." Lisa C. Ikemoto, Traces of the Master Narrative in the 
Story of African American I Kmean American Conflict: How We Constructed "Los Angeles," 
66 S. CAL L. REv. 1581, 1582 (1993) (footnote omitted). I suggest that lkemoto's point 
might be applied usefully to the role of the master narrative in maintaining intragroup con­
flict - such as "Darden versus Cochran" or "sellouts versus race cards" - as well. See also 
Charles R. Lawrence III, The Message of the Verdict: A Three-Act Morality Play Starring 
Clarence Thomas, Willie Smith, and Mike Tyson, in RACE, GENDER, AND PO\VER IN 
AMERICA: THE LEGACY OF THE HILL-THOMAS HEARINGS, supra note 21, at 118 n.3 ("In 
using the term 'Master Narrative' . . .  I refer ... to the narrative of American society in which 
the subordination of certain groups has been structured along race and gender lines."). 
24. See Janny Scott, The Joy of Deconstructing O.J.: At Symposium, Deep Thoughts and 
Cheap Thrills, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1996, at Bl (analyzing scholarly obsession with deriving 
social significance and historical lessons from the Simpson case). For a compelling analysis of 
race and gender in both the OJ. Simpson and Susan Smith murder trials, see Cheryl I. Har­
ris, The Foulston & Siefkin Lecture: Myths of Race and Gender in the Trials of O.J. Simpson 
and Susan Smith - Spectacles of Our Times, 35 WASHBURN LJ. 225 (1996). 
25: There are, of course, voluminous sources of information about this matter. Major 
media have covered the case since its inception in June 1994 with the murders of Nicole 
Brown Simpson and Ronald Goldman, and their preoccupation continued in connection with 
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pher Darden and Johnnie Cochran. For what it is worth, I believe 
that both men are talented lawyers committed in many respects to 
racial justice and Black community betterment. Rather, my point is 
to demonstrate that the public accentuation of the Cochran-Darden 
conflict - as well as the valorization and vilification to which each 
man has been subjected - reveals far more about the burdens 
shared by all Black attorneys than about Cochran's and Darden's 
individual differences. 
II. LESSONS FROM ELDERS: THE NEXUS BETWEEN RACE AND 
THE UNDERMINING OF PROFESSIONAL CREDIBILITY 
The achievements and visibility of a substantial number of 
Blacks in the legal profession constitute a relatively new phenome­
non, but tlie scrutiny and suspicion with which they are treated in 
mainstream legal practice do not. Often, such distrust expresses an 
underlying belief that being reasoned and objective as a legal pro­
fessional - particularly with regard to issues of race - is somehow 
at odds with the sustenance of Black racial identity. For example, a 
generation ago, in Pennsylvania v. Local Union 542, International 
Union of Operating Engineers, 26 Judge Leon Higginbotham was 
called upon by defendants to recuse himself from a class action 
brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and other civil rights 
statutes. The state-initiated suit sought legal and equitable relief 
against defendant union officials for alleged race discrimination 
against the twelve Black complainants and the class they repre­
sented. In their motion for recusal,27 the defendants argued that 
Judge Higginbotham's status as a prominent Black civil rights 
scholar and advocate rendered him unqualified to adjudicate claims 
of race discrimination in a fair and impartial manner. In a lengthy 
the civil trial of the Brown and Goldman families·against Simpson. In addition, many of the 
attorneys on both sides of the criminal prosecution have published books about the trial. See, 
e.g., JOHNNIE L. CoCHRAN, JR. WITH TIM RUTIEN, JouRNEY TO JusuCE (1996); CHruSTo­
PHER A. DARDEN WflH JESS WALTER, IN CoNTEMPT (1996); ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, REA­
SONABLE DOUBTS: THE OJ. SIMPSON CASE AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1996); 
ROBERT L. SHAPIRO WITH LARKIN WARREN, THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE: A DEFENSE AT­
TORNEY'S BRIEF ON THE OJ. SIMPSON CASE (1996); UELMEN, supra note 22. Other recent 
books about the case include VINCENT BuGuosr, OUTRAGE: THE F1VE REASONS WHY OJ. 
SIMPSON GoT AWAY WITH MURDER (1996) and JEFFREY TooBIN, THE RuN OF His LIFE 
(1996). Recently, a law journal devoted an entire issue to the topic of race and gender in the 
Simpson case. See 6 HASTINGS WoMEN's L.J. 121 (1995). 
26. 388 F. Supp. 155 (E.D. Pa. 1974). 
27. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1988) ("Whenever a party to any proceeding in a dis­
trict court makes and files a timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the 
matter is pending has a personal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any ad­
verse party, such judge shall proceed no further therein, but another judge shall be assigned 
to hear such proceeding."). 
· 
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and detailed consideration of the motion, Judge Higginbotham 
summarized the defendants' reasons for requesting disqualification 
as follows: 
That "I [have] identified, and [do] identify, [myself] with causes of 
blacks, including the cause of correction of social injustices which [I 
believe] have been caused to blacks"; that I have made myself "a par­
ticipant in those causes, including the cause of correction of social 
injustices which [I believe] have been caused to blacks"; ... [t]hat "in 
view of the applicable federal law," and by reason of my "personal 
and emotional commitments to civil rights causes of the black com­
munity, the black community expectation as to [my] leadership and 
spokesmanship therein, and the basic tenet of our legal system requir­
ing both actual and apparent impartiality in the federal courts," my 
"continuation ... as trier of fact, molder of remedy and arbiter of all 
issues constitutes judicial impropriety."28 
28. 388 F. Supp. at 158 (quoting defendants' affidavits in support of the motion). In his 
opinion denying the motion, Judge Higginbotham summarized the fifteen allegations relied 
upon by the defendants in their affidavits. The accompanying text represents the court's 
summary of the last two of these fifteen points, which I have chosen to excerpt because they 
seem most emblematic of the charge of "bias" brought by the defendants. However, because 
I do not wish to risk mischaracterizing or unfairly truncating the broad-ranging nature of 
defendants' plethora of claims of bias, I include Judge Higginbotham's summary of their first 
thirteen points as well: 
1. That the instant case is a class action, brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 
other civil rights statutes, charging that defendants have discriminated against the twelve 
black plaintiffs and the class they represent on the basis of race, and seeking extensive 
equitable and legal remedies for the alleged discrimination; 
2. That I will try the instant case without a jury, and that I am black; 
3. That on Friday, October 25, 1974, I addressed a luncheon meeting of the Association 
for the Study of Afro-American Life and History, during the 59th Annual Meeting of 
that organization, "a group composed of black historians"; 
4. That in the course of that speech I criticized two recent Supreme Court decisions 
which involved alleged racial discrimination, and said, inter alia, that: 
(a) "I do not see the [Supreme] Court of the 1970's or envision the Court of the 
1980's as the major instrument for significant change and improvement in the quality of 
race relations in America"; 
(b) "The message of these recent decisions is that if we are to deal with the concept 
of integration, we must probably make our major efforts in another forum"; 
(c) "As I see it, we must make major efforts in other forums without exclusive reli­
ance on the federal legal process." 
5. That I used the pronoun "we" several times in the course of the speech, and that my 
use of this pronoun evidences my "intimate tie with and emotional attachment to the 
advancement of black civil rights"; 
6. That by my agreement to deliver the speech I presented myself as "a leader in the 
future course of the black civil rights movement"; 
7. That my speech took place in "an extra-judicial and community context," and not in 
the course of this litigation; 
8. That the following day, Saturday, October 26, 1974, The Philadelphia Inquirer pub­
lished "an article appearing under a predominant headline on the first page of the met­
ropolitan news section, . . . describing the October 25th meeting and publishing the 
aforementioned quotes"; 
9. That approximately 450,000 copies of The Philadelphia Inquirer containing this ac­
count were distributed publicly on or about October 26, 1974; 
10. That this account made "the community at large" aware of my "significant role as a 
spokesman, scholar and active supporter of the advancement of the causes of 
integration"; 
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The extraordinary nature of the defendants' disqualification mo­
tion did not go unnoticed by Judge Higginbotham, nor did its un­
derlying assumptions about the nexus between being Black and the 
ability to fulfill professional obligations of fairness and impartiality 
with respect to issues of race. In an opinion even more extraordi­
nary than the motion itself, Judge Higginbotham engaged in a bril­
liant disquisition on racial injustice, the burdens suffered by Blacks 
in the legal profession,29 and the "raced" nature of all jurispru­
dence. Acknowledging the difficulty inherent in acting as "judge in 
[one's] own case"30 - that is, in assessing his own impartiality, as 
required by the recusal statute - Judge Higginbotham carefully ad­
dressed the factual underpinnings of each of the defendants' asser­
tions and responded to their claims of bias in great detail. He 
explained why his pride in his heritage and commitment to racial 
equality should not be viewed as a "partisan" matter that would 
somehow compromise or undermine his professional integrity.31 In 
rejecting the defendants' tacit presumption that a Black judge 
posed a unique threat to norms of judicial neutrality with respect to 
race, he commented: 
[A] threshold question which might be inferred from defendants' peti­
tion is: Since blacks (like most other thoughtful Americans) are 
aware of the "sordid chapter in American history" of racial injustice, 
shouldn't black judges be disqualified per se from adjudicating cases 
involving claims of racial discrimination? ... [T]he absolute conse­
quence and thrust of their rationale would amount to, in practice, a 
double standard within the federal judiciary. By that standard, white 
judges will be permitted to keep the latitude they have enjoyed for 
centuries in discussing matters of intellectual substance, even issues of 
11. That I believe "that there has been social injustice to blacks in the United States"; 
"that these injustices must be corrected and remedied"; and "that they must be reme­
died by extra-judicial efforts by blacks, including [myself]"; 
12. That "the very invitation to speak," "the content of [my] remarks" and my "posing 
for photographs" after the address identify me as "a leader for and among blacks," and 
"one of the country's leading civil rights proponents"; 
13. That I am a "celebrity" within the black community .... 
388 F. Supp. at 157-58 (footnotes omitted). 
29. In explaining the considerable lengths undertaken to provide historical context, schol­
arly documentation, and precise analytical constructs for his reasoning in denying a seem­
ingly "simple" motion to recuse, Judge Higginbotham commented: 
Blacks must meet not only the normal obligations which confront their colleagues, but 
often they must spend extraordinary amounts of time in answering irrational positions 
and assertions before they can fulfill their primary public responsibilities. 
388 F. Supp. at 181-82. 
30. 388 F. Supp. at 161. 
31. See 388 F. Supp. at 166; see also 388 F. Supp. at 163 ("I concede that I am black. I do 
not apologize for that obvious fact. I take rational pride in my heritage, just as most other 
ethnics take pride in theirs. However, that one is black does not mean, ipso facto, that he is 
anti-white; no more than being Jewish implies being anti-Catholic, or being Cath1Jlic implies 
being anti-Protestant. . . .  "). 
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human rights and, because they are white, still be permitted to later 
decide specific factual situations involving the principles of human 
rights which they have discussed previously in a generalized fashion. 
But for black judges, defendants insist on a far more rigid standard, 
which would preclude black judges from ever discussing race relations 
even in the generalized fashion that other justices and judges have 
discussed issues of human rights. Under defendants' standards, if a 
black judge discusses race relations, he should thereafter be precluded 
from adjudicating matters, involving specific claims of racial 
discrimination. 32 
Although Judge Higginbotham's opinion in Pennsylvania v. 
Local Union 542 represents the most detailed response to a motion 
for disqualification made in this vein, other Black judges have been 
subjected to similar challenges. Judge Constance Baker Motley, for 
example, defended her professional competence to preside over a 
sex discrimination case, explaining with withering succinctness that 
everyone - and not just she as a Black woman - is possessed of 
racial identity and gender identity.33 Judge Higginbotham's and 
Judge Motley's observations, although articulated over two decades 
ago in the context of recusal challenges to the professional compe­
tence of Black members of the judiciary, have enormous signifi­
cance for Black lawyers today who demand mainstream respect for 
and acceptance of their many-faceted roles as legal professionals 
and as advocates for racial and gender justice. One of the hard 
truths learned from Judges Higginbotham, Motley, and other "el­
ders"34 is that "minority" race, gender, or both subject one to ongo-
32. 388 F. Supp. at 165 (footnotes omitted). 
33. See Blank v. Sullivan & Cromwell, 418 F. Supp. 1, 4-5 (S.D. N.Y. 1975); see also 
United States v. Alabama, 582 F. Supp. 1197, 1200-02 (N.D. Ala. 1984) (Dyer, J.) (denying 
motion for disqualification filed against Judge U.W. Clemon in a race segregation case after 
the U.S. Court of Appeals ordered that another judge be assigned to hear the recusal pro­
ceedings); Paschall v. Mayone, 454 F. Supp. 1289, 1301 (S.D. N.Y. 1978) (Carter, J.) (denying 
motion for disqualification in race discrimination case). Interestingly, all three of the above 
cases - as well as Pennsylvania v. Local Union 542 - involved challenges to the impartiality 
of Black judges who had been civil rights lawyers before their appointments to the bench. 
For a recent example of the controversy surrounding a recusal motion filed against a Black 
federal judge in a civil rights case, see Doug Bandow, No Justice for Proposition 209, WASH· 
INGTON TIMES, Jan. 14, 1997, at A15 (discussing efforts to remove Judge Thelton E. Hender­
son from presiding over Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1488 (1996)); 
Howard Mintz, Prop. 209 Defenders Struggle in Court, THE RECORDER, Dec. 17, 1996, at 1; 
Carol Ness, Temporary Ban on Prop. 209 Extended to All Agencies; Preference Law's Sup­
porters Seek Judge's Ouster, Citing ACLU Connections, SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER, Dec. 17, 
1996, at A3. For examples of recusal motions based on allegations of other "group"-related 
loyalties, see United States v. Ibraham El-Gabrowny, 844 F. Supp. 955, 961-62 (S.D.N.Y. 
1994) (Mukasey, J.) (denying motion for disqualification in the World Trade Center bombing 
prosecution which was based in part on defense attorney William Kunstler's assertions that 
Judge Mukasey's adherence to precepts of Orthodox Judaism and Zionism would cause him 
to be biased against the defense and providing examples of other recusal motions). 
34. For other chronicles of these "elders," see DERRICK BELL, CONFRONTING AUTHOR­
ITY: REFLECTIONS OF AN ARDENT PROTESTER (1994); J.L. CHESTNUT, JR. & JULIA CASS, 
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ing and pervasive assumptions of nonobjectivity and incompetence, 
particularly with regard to explicitly raced or gendered cases; the 
presumption is that "minority" group loyalties will taint profes­
sional ethics in a way that "majority" affiliations will not. As I shall 
discuss below, the present-day manifestations of these beliefs are 
different only in form but not in substance from the more explicit 
racial stereotypes applied to Black lawyers of earlier generations. 
III. "SELLOUTS" AND "RACE CARDS": THE DARDEN DILEMMA 
AND THE CocHRAN CmfUNDRUM 
A. The Darden Dilemma Redefined 
In his bestselling memoir of the Simpson case, prosecutor Chris-
topher Darden comments: 
I understand that some black prosecutors have a name for the pres­
sure they feel from those in the community who criticize them for 
standing up and convicting black criminals. They call it the "Darden 
Dilemma."35 
Darden elaborates upon this theme in considerable detail through­
out his book, explaining that his affection, pride, and concern for 
the Black community - his community - significantly motivated 
his decision to seek a law degree and to become a prosecutor.36 He 
informs the reader of his life-long personal and professional com­
mitment to the betterment of African Americans.37 He further 
points out that in his pre-Simpson prosecutorial career, he devoted 
BLACK IN SELMA: THE UNCOMMON LIFE OF J.L. CHEslNUT, JR. (1990); MICHAEL D. DA VIS 
& HUNTER R. CLARK, THURGOOD MARsHALL: WARRIOR i;._T THE BAR, REBEL ON THE 
BENCH (1992); RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF 
EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (1975); GENNA RAE MC­
NEIL, GROUNDWORK: CHARI.Es HAMILTON HOUSTON AND THE STRUGGLE FOR Crvrr. 
RIGHTS (1983); PAULI MURRAY, SONG IN A WEARY THROAT: AN AMERICAN PILGRIMAGE 
(1987); JESSIE CARNEY SMTIH, EPIC LIVES: ONE HUNDRED BLACK WOMEN WHO MADE A 
DIFFERENCE (1993); MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING Crvrr. RIGHTS LAW: THuRGOOD MAR­
SHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1936-1961 {1994); GILBERT WARE, WILLIAM HASTIE: 
GRACE UNDER PRESSURE {1984); John George, Solo in Soul Country, in THE RELEVANT 
LAWYERS, supra note l, at 367-82. 
35. DARDEN, supra note 25, at 472-73. The so-called Darden Dilemma has persisted as a 
subject of much commentary in the mainstream press - nationally and internationally -
even many months after the Simpson verdict. See, e.g., William Claiborne, One Angry Man: 
He Couldn't Convince the Jury, but Christopher Darden Isn't Resting His Case, WASH. PoST, 
Mar. 20, 1996, at Bl; Ellis Cose, The Darden Dilemma, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 25, 1996, at 58; Ros 
Davidson, Lawyer at Heart of Race Dilemma, ScoTLAND ON SUNDAY, May 26, 1996, at 15, 
available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws Ftle; Ken Hamblin, No Excuse for Color-Coded 
Justice, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Apr. 10, 1996, at Al5, available in 1996 WL 8200403; Stebbins 
Jefferson, Guilty of Having Moral Standards, PALM BEACH POST, Apr. 6, 1996, at Al, avail­
able in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File. 
36. See DARDEN WITH WALTER, supra note 25, at 65-67, 106-07. 
37. See id. at 14, 201, 471. 
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considerable energies to investigating and prosecuting racist and 
other lawless behavior in the Los Angeles Police Department.38 
Why then, he anguishes, was he branded by some in the Black com­
munity a "sellout" and a "token" for his decision to join in the pros­
ecution of a wealthy Black celebrity who had evinced little concern 
for Blacks and had immersed himself in white privilege throughout 
his adult life? Darden laments: 
I had naively believed my presence would, in some way, embolden my 
black brothers and sisters, show them that this was their system as 
well, that we were making progress . . . [I]nstead I was branded an 
Uncle Tom, a traitor used by The Man.39 
Notwithstanding what I consider to be his genuine and justifi­
able torment over his apparent ostracism from some in the Black 
community,40 I think that Darden's articulation of the so-called 
Darden Dilemma ignores the root cause of his quandary. In his 
insistence on interpreting the charges of "sellout" and "token" al­
most entirely as a personal individual slight against him by the 
Black community rather than as a justifiably skeptical reaction to 
the broader racial implications of the supposedly colorblind 
prosecutorial strategies employed in the Simpson case,41 he seems 
38. See id. at 117-39. 
39. Id. at 13-14. 
40. Despite the pervasive impression that Darden was uniformly reviled and rebuffed by 
a "monolithic" Black community, some Black leaders praised his work on the case and ac­
knowledged the difficult nature of his role on the prosecution team. See, e.g., Andrea Ford, 
Black Leaders to Honor Darden as Role Model, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1995, at Bl; see also 
Henry Weinstein, Delicate Case Ends on Up Note for Darden, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1995, at 
Al. Weinstein reported the views of two Black leaders thus: 
"As an African American lawyer, I would say that the buttons on my shirt were 
popping with pride - he did a magnificent job," said Reginald Holmes, former presi­
dent of the Langston Bar Assn., the largest black lawyers organization in Southern 
California . 
. . . "From the beginning he's been in the hot seat - an almost impossible position," 
said Earl Ofari Hutchinson, veteran black activist and • • .  author of the forthcoming 
book "Beyond O.J.: Race, Sex, and Class Lessons for America." 
"He's feeling the pressure. He's got to be mindful of the negative comments. I think 
it has caused him a lot of personal discomfort and cognitive dissonance. He's in a no-win 
situation." 
Id. at Al8. 
41. Others have articulated and emphasized quite different concerns in defining the 
Darden Dilemma. See, e.g., Paul Butler, Christopher Darden: Sour Grapes From a Sore 
Loser, L.A. TIMES, March 25, 1996, at BS (criticizing Darden for invoking a so-called di­
lemma as an excuse to blame Black jurors for his own professional mistakes, and asserting 
that Blacks generally are proud of Black prosecutors who use their power responsibly); Joan 
Ullman, In Contempt, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 26, 1996, at 2 (reviewing DARDEN WITH WALTER, supra 
note 25 (summarizing the underlying question posed by the Darden Dilemma as: "How can 
any black prosecutor justify his role of sending more black men into prisons already over­
crowded with this minority population, or worse yet, of wresting convictions that carry the 
death penalty?")); James Varney, Few Black Lawyers Work for DA's Office, NEW ORLEANS 
TIMES-PICAYUNE, Apr. 15, 1996, at Al, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File 
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to view his dilemma as a dichotomous conflict of a Black prosecu­
tor's loyalty to justice versus obeisance to antiwhite racism in Black 
communities. This interpretation is reinforced by much of the hy­
perbolic and at times contemptuous public commentary that helped 
construct the Darden Dilemma: the brave, law-abiding Black pros­
ecutor versus the Simpson-loving, lawless Black community and ju­
rors;42 the truth-seeking "colorblindness" of the State versus the 
inflammatory race-baiting of the defense; the Black attorney's 
choice of seeking justice (even at the risk of being called a sellout) 
versus playing the race card.43 By failing to reflect upon the distor­
tion of meaning inherent in such constructions, Darden was as 
much a victim of these false dichotomies as he was their embodi­
ment and defender. 
A more nuanced understanding of the Darden Dilemma would 
acknowledge the integrity of Black communities, Black jurors, and 
Black attorneys in Darden's position who inevitably confront simi­
lar predicaments. This reinterpretation would focus intently on the 
broader legal, political, and societal framework within which all of 
these actors operate.44 As discussed earlier, it is my view that 
racism severely limits the public credibility and lawyering choices of 
Black attorneys not only in a vertical, ladder-climbing, "glass ceil­
ing" career sense, but also in terms of the latitude and autonomy 
(" 'I've been battling this ever since law school in 1984,' said Orleans Parish assistant district 
attorney Glen Woods, who is black. 'How can you walk in and prosecute another African­
American when you know how we've been persecuted? There aren't many of us, but I'd 
rather be on the inside watching white people to make sure they don't screw us over.' "). 
42. For a examination of various meanings of lawbreaking to Blacks, see Regina Austin, 
"The Black Community," Its Lawbreakers, and a Politics of Identification, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 
1769 (1992). 
43. Ken Hamblin provides a particularly noxious example of this false dichotomization: 
We all might assume that obeying the law and applying it equally under the Constitu­
tion would be a tough job for your average white racist member of the Ku Klux Klan, 
the Aryan Nation or the skinheads - hypothesizing that one of them could rise to 
power as a district attorney. We would demand nonetheless that they leave their bias 
behind to serve as the people's counsel. 
But what are the obligations of minorities? Should we allow them to maintain a 
special allegiance to people of color? 
. . .  [M]inority prosecutors face people who see them as "turncoats for having the 
temerity to prosecute people of color.'' 
I call that liberal hogwash, pure and simple. If you can't stand the heat, get out of the 
kitchen. Become a social worker or go to work in the public defender's office before 
pursuing the fast-track political career of a big-city prosecutor. 
Stop polluting the legal profession. 
Hamblin, supra note 35, at 15. 
44. See, e.g., Varney, supra note 41 (discussing the complex effects of economic, political, 
philosophical, and personal factors on Blacks' decisions to become prosecutors). According 
to figures cited by an official of the National Black Prosecutors Association, approximately 
800 (or three percent) of the 30,000 prosecutors nationwide are Black, as compared with four 
percent of the defense attorneys. See id. 
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that they are accorded in juggling and reconciling competing obliga­
tions to Black communities and to the legal profession at large. 
Moreover, as Black attorneys seek an integrated and authentic fu­
sion of personal and professional identities in a legal system that 
relegates them to a mere token presence, they often face confine­
ment along an extremely narrow continuum of stereotypical identi­
ties. If they choose a career path not typically associated with the 
pursuit of racial justice - for example, corporate law or criminal 
prosecution - dominant popular discourse (even more than the 
"Black community") pigeonholes them with an array of labels ("as­
similationist," "colorblind," "mainstream," "conservative," "sell­
out"), all of which reinforce the ideology that such individuals are 
divorced from their "Blackness"; Black attorneys in such a situation 
face the dubious "privilege" of being rewarded and valorized by 
white institutional culture for the very qualities that gamer doubt 
and suspicion from minority communities.45 This contributes to the 
systemic schizophrenia that lies at the heart of the Darden Di­
lemma and that legitimately fuels Black community critiques in par­
ticular circumstances.46 
45. The role of whites - and not just or even primarily Blacks - in constructing and 
perpetuating these assumptions should not be underestimated. Consider also the vastly dif­
ferent ideological concerns that may undergird majority attitudes in their relations with so­
called assimilationist Blacks in the context of the following retrospective on the life of Ron­
ald H. Brown, the Black commercial lawyer and former Democratic National Committee 
chairperson who served as Commerce Secretary in the Clinton administration: 
Some viewed Mr. Brown {the son of a middle-class family) as proof that race is no 
longer a barrier to success; that policies such as affirmative action - which they consider 
unfair anyway - should be jettisoned. "By any definition, he was an amazing success in 
the American political arena," said Clint Bolick, vice president of the Institute for Jus­
tice, a public interest law firm that opposes affirmative action. "It kind of proves that 
the American system works; that if you've got brains and talent you can rise to the top 
regardless of your race." 
• . •  [M]any people, particularly business executives he dealt with as Commerce Secre­
tary, say they did not see his race at all when they looked at him, just skill at deal-making 
and promoting American business interests abroad. 
Steven A. Holmes, Remembering Ron Brown: So Visible, but From Which Angle?, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 7, 1996, § 4, at 1. Assertions such as the one made by Bolick reveal an ignorance 
of - or perhaps refusal to respect -Mr. Brown's relations with the community as well as his 
concerns for Black community empowerment. 
46. There is some indication that the much-publicized Darden Dilemma has engendered 
broader public awareness of the persistence of these concerns among Blacks at least to a 
limited extent. Steven Holmes writes: 
[I]f Mr. Brown evokes a confusion, it is focused mainly among whites. For in his adept­
ness at playing many roles, he was the very model for the increased number of blacks 
striding into the professional class - with varying degrees of success - who must strad­
dle two different and often mutually suspicious worlds. As they deal with enhanced 
opportunities, glass ceilings, grumblings from whites that they are too willing to play the 
race card, and self-doubts about whether they are becoming Uncle Toms, they can look 
at Mr. Brown and see something startlingly familiar. Themselves. 
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On the other hand, Black attorneys who select a career typically 
thought of as more "community-oriented" in nature - for exam­
ple, civil rights or criminal defense - are often accorded a different 
set of labels equally superficial and inadequate, which express dom­
inant cultural assumptions that their race-based advocacy as well as 
their race compromise their ·ethics and their professionalism. Both 
models are founded upon an atomistic conception of the Black at­
torney as a solo agent who must somehow both represent and tran­
scend categorical assumptions about her race. 
Unfortunately, at present the burgeoning genre of legal litera­
ture on lawyering theory includes little to address these concerns2 
but a few notable exceptions exist. For example, in a recent essay 
Paul Butler effectively describes the genesis of his own "prosecu­
tor's dilemma" as deriving not from any unfair, externally imposed 
community pressure, but from his own introspection and evolving 
self-critique regarding the paradoxical nature of his work: 
I was a Special Assistant United States Attorney in the District of 
Columbia in 1990. I prosecuted people accused of misdemeanor 
crimes, mainly the drug and gun cases that overwhelm the local courts 
of most American cities. As a federal prosecutor, I represented the 
United States of America and used that power to put people, mainly 
African-American men, in prison. I am also an African-American 
man. While at the U.S. Attorney's office, I made two discoveries that 
profoundly changed the way I viewed my work as a prosecutor and 
my responsibilities as a black person. 
The first discovery occurred during a training session for new As­
sistants conducted by experienced prosecutors. We rookies were in­
formed that we would lose many of our cases, despite having 
persuaded a jury beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was 
guilty. We would lose because some black jurors would refuse to con­
vict black defendants who they knew were guilty. 
The second discovery was related to the first, but was even more 
unsettling. It occurred during the trial of Marion Barry, then the sec­
ond-term mayor of the District of Columbia. Barry was being prose­
cuted by my office for drug possession and perjury. I learned, to my 
surprise, that some of my fellow African-American prosecutors hoped 
that the mayor would be acquitted, despite the fact that he was obvi­
ously guilty of at least one of the charges - he had smoked cocaine 
on FBI videotape. These black prosecutors wanted their office to lose 
its case because they believed that the prosecution of Barry was 
ra�� 
. 
Id. at 4. For a more extended consideration of the burdens of Black professional life, see 
ELLIS CosE, THE RAGE OF A PRIVILEGED CLAss (1993); JoE R. FEAGIN & MELVIN P. SIKES, 
LIVING WITH RACISM: THE BLACK MIDDLE-CLASS EXPERIENCE (1994). 
47. Butler, supra note 15, at 678 (footnotes omitted). 
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Butler proceeds from these perceptions to question the broader 
racial implications of his own prosecutorial role, and to advance the 
thesis that the. race of a Black defendant is "sometimes a legally and 
morally appropriate factor for jurors to consider in reaching a ver­
dict of not guilty or for an individual juror to consider in refusing to 
vote for conviction."48 
In a related vein, David Wilkins examines the dilemmas of 
Black law students and attorneys who seek to integrate a career in 
corporate law with goals of racial justice and Black community re­
sponsibility, and advances an "obligation thesis" that urges "black 
corporate lawyers to recognize that they have moral obligations 
running to the black community that must be balanced against 
other legitimate professional duties and personal commitments 
when deciding on particular actions and, more generally, when con­
structing a morally acceptable life plan."49 To this end, Wilkins rec­
ommends that law schools take an active role in assisting Black law 
students in acquiring the critical skills and empirical knowledge 
needed to avoid the pressures of assimilation and seeming "race 
neutrality" that attends corporate legal practice.so 
The Darden Dilemma, then, might be more usefully and broadly 
explored as an ongoing interplay of competing values within Black 
attorneys who are attemptjng to puzzle through the implications of 
their professional choices for the well-being of Black communities. 
This inner tension may be influenced, heightened, and at times per­
haps exacerbated by Black community critiques, but it is inherently 
and inevitably a result of a legal system that devalues all Black 
lives, including the token Black attorneys it ostensibly valorizes as 
the honored few. According to this proposed redefinition, the 
Black community did not create the Darden Dilemma, nor did 
Christopher Darden or Black prosecutors generally. Rather, it is an 
unavoidable structural component of a legal system originated and 
maintained under racial hierarchy. Armed with this revelation, 
Black attorneys can be empowered to expand their choices, rather 
than be relegated to them. 
Indeed, given the seeming inevitability of the Darden Dilemma 
and other paradoxes in the Black lawyer's experience, it would 
appear to be a sign of mental health that Black lawyers and Black 
communities continue to experience and express cognitive disso-
48. Id. at 679. 
49. Wiikins, supra note 18, at 1984. 
50. See id. at 1984, 2013-26. 
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nance and chronic dissatisfaction with their assigned lot in the legal 
system.51 In this regard, the Darden Dilemma might be reclaimed 
and revitalized by Black attorneys and Black communities as a basis 
for reconnection and debate.52 I would hope that this reconnection 
would . differ greatly from the wearying pressures of majority­
imposed race work discussed above, in that the underlying notions 
of obligation would be developed through community-based reflec­
tion, rather than through the norms of mainstream legal practice. 
B. The Fallacy of Colorblind Lawyering 
The above-proposed redefinition of the Darden Dilemma also 
can serve to question an overly rigid adherence to notions of color­
blindness in lawyering strategy. In using the term "colorblind" 
lawyering, I draw upon the work of critical race theory, which ex­
plores broadly the premise that ineradicable currents of racism per­
vade the law, and advances race consciousness as a method of 
analyzing and ameliorating racism's effects.53 Critical race theorists 
challenge prevailing assumptions that race and color are social and 
legal categories that can be made not to matter simply by pronounc­
ing them - even from a hopeful, liberal standpoint - to be incon­
sequential. According to these critiques, the most perilous fallacy 
of colorblind ideology is that it is wishful or wilful determiriation, or 
both, to ignore historical and systemic racism perpetuates the false 
belief that "racelessness" is equivalent to neutrality, objectivity, 
fairness, and equality.54 As applied to the lawyering process, I in­
tend the term "colorblind" lawyering to connote advocacy strate-
51. In her memoirs of her life of "volunteer slavery" as a Black journalist in predomi­
nantly white environments, Jill Nelson vividly describes the mental and emotional strains 
involved in the juggling of contradictory professional and personal identities: 
I've also been doing the standard Negro balancing act when it comes to dealing with 
white folks, which involves sufficiently blurring the edges of my being so that they don't 
feel intimidated, while simultaneously holding on to my integrity. There is a thin line 
between Uncle Tomming and Mau-Mauing. To fall off that line can mean disaster. On 
one side lies employment and self-hatred: on the other, the equally dubious honor of 
unemployment with integrity. Walking that line as if it were a tightrope results in some­
thing like employment with honor, although I'm not sure exactly how that works. 
JILL NELSON, VOLUNTEER SLAVERY 10 (1993). 
52. Consider how Delgado urges the rejection of externally imposed "role model" bur­
dens in favor of a more liberating relationship between minority legal professionals and their 
communities. See Delgado, supra note 9, at 1230-31. 
53. For recent critiques of colorblind mythology, see generally Neil Gotanda, A Critique 
of "Our Constitution is Co/or-Blind," 44 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1991); HANEY L6PEZ, supra note 
2; Harris, supra note 8. 
54. Kimberle W. Crenshaw, a principal critical race theorist, elucidates this point in writ­
ing that the ostensible "objectivity of legal analysis is grounded in the apparent perspective­
lessness of the dominant discourse." Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Foreword: Toward a 
Race-Conscious Pedagogy In Legal Education, 11 NATL. BLACK L.J. 1, 12 (1989). 
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gies premised upon the position that racism is or should be 
characterized as irrelevant to a particular context, even if it has 
been otherwise raised in the proceedings.ss 
In the Simpson case, this norm turned out to be of paramount 
and ultimately dispositive significance, particularly given Darden's 
vociferous public insistence from early in the proceedings that race 
was not an issue in the case. From a critical race-conscious as well 
as a pragmatic perspective, the flawed and indeed misleading na­
ture of the publicly advanced prosecutorial stance of colorblindness 
is obvious. Even within the framework of the prosecution's prof­
fered theory of the case, there would have been a significant differ­
ence between arguing the indeterminate or minimal role of racism 
in the case in chief and claiming that allegations of racism were sim­
ply irrelevant. Regardless of one's view of the strength of the case 
against Simpson - and indeed regardless of one's view of who was 
responsible for first articulating race as a factor - issues of race 
permeated the case from its inception: from prosecutorial strate­
gies regarding where to try the case; to the acquiescence on both 
sides to try the case in part in the voyeuristic "court of public opin­
ion"; to both sides' selection of jurors and counsel; and so forth.s6 
Against this backdrop, the prosecution's repeated assertions that 
race was not an issue in the case appeared not only wishful and 
deluded, but deliberately misleading. Although the prosecution's 
stance is more accurately and comprehensibly explained as the ar­
gument that race was irrelevant to the factual predicates of the de­
fendant's guilt or innocence, this point was obscured by the 
prosecution's broader rhetorical incantation of the "race doesn't 
matter" theme. This strategic stance of avowed "racelessness" in 
the face of the realities of the unfolding Simpson defense and its 
broader social context illustrate the fallacy of colorblind lawyering: 
pretending and asserting that race doesn't matter is not equivalent 
to neutrality and "perspectivelessness. "S7 In fact, it is a perspective: 
one of studied indifference to the significance of race. 
55. For a race-conscious critique of the "liberal regime" of colorblindness in criminal de­
fense advocacy, see Alfieri, supra note 18, at 1331-32 (arguing for the "race-ing" of legal 
ethics with regard to criminal defense lawyers' deployment of disempowering racial 
narratives). 
56. As Brent Staples observes: 
The statement that race had no place in the trial is dishonest on its face. The so­
called race card was played when District Attorney Gil Garcetti decided to try the case 
before a mainly black jury downtown instead of before a white jury in Santa Monica. 
Conviction by a mainly black jury would insulate Mr. Garcetti from riots like those that 
accompanied the acquittal of the white policemen who beat Rodney King. 
Brent Staples, Millions for Defense, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1996, § 7 (Book Review), at 15. 
57. On "perspectivelessness," see Crenshaw, supra note 54, at 10-12. 
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The misguided and unrealistic adoption of a model of colorblind 
lawyering can pose especially onerous pressures on the Black attor­
ney. In seeking to reconcile a stated professional - and perhaps 
even personal - norm of colorblind ideology with the personal ex­
periential knowledge that of course race does matter significantly in 
the legal system, whether or not one wants it to matter, the Black 
attorney in such a situation encounters the daunting task of synthe­
sizing conflicting ethical, personal, and advocacy priorities. 
Thus, for example, Darden undermined his own colorblind 
lawyering strategy in one of the most highly publicized Darden­
Cochran conflicts of the proceedings: his courtroom battle with 
Cochran over the admissibility of testimony regarding prosecution 
witness Mark Fuhrman's use of the epithet "nigger." Darden's ulti­
mately unsuccessful argument for exclusion reflected simul­
taneously the colorblind position that race was not and should not 
be allowed to develop as a factor in the case, and the tacitly race­
conscious realization that the racist utterances of a key witness 
would be of dispositive significance to the Black jurors: 
If you allow Mr. Cochran to use this word and play the race card 
. . .  the direction and focus of the case changes: it is a race case now. 
It becomes an issue of color . . . . It becomes a question of who is 
the blackest man up here . . . .  
It's the filthiest, dirtiest, nastiest word in the English language . . . .  
It will do one thing. It will upset the black jurors. It will say, Whose 
side are you on, "the man" or "the brothers"? 
. . .  There's a mountain of evidence pointing to this man's guilt, but 
when you mention that word to this jury, or any African-American, it 
blinds people. It'll blind the jury. It'll blind the truth. They won't be 
able to discern what's true and what's not.58 
Given that - as argued above - every case argued by a Black 
attorney is at some level a "race case" in which the Black attorney 
is forced to represent race beyond the boundaries of the particular 
dispute in question, an ideology of colorblind lawyering puts the 
58. Kenneth B. Noble, Issue of Racism Erupts in Simpson Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 
1995, at 7. To this argument, Cochran responded: 
It's demeaning to our jury . . .  to say that African-Americans who've lived under 
oppression for 200-plus years in this country cannot work in the mainstream. African­
Americans live with offensive words, offensive looks, offensive treatment every day of 
their lives. And yet they still believe in this country. 
Id.; see also Wtlliam Carlsen, Race Issue Finally Boils Over in Simpson Hearing, S.F. CHR.oN., 
Jan. 14, 1995, at Al, available in 1995 WL 5261467; Tony Freemantle, Pair Argue Disclosure 
of Epithets, HOUSTON CHRoN., Jan. 14, 1995, at l, available in 1995 WL 5882802; Lisa Resper 
et al., Blacks Debate Issue of Race in Simpson Case, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1995, at Al; Ed 
Vulliamy, N-Word Stirs 0./. Trial's Racial Cauldron, THE GUARDIAN (London), Jan. 22, 
1995, at 16, available in 1995 WL 7575906. 
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Black attorney at a serious disadvantage: she must deny the reali­
ties of racism in order to appear balanced and fair in advaneing the 
case of the client. The pervasive and systemic role of racism in the 
legal system belies the assumption that the world can be neatly di­
vided into "race cases" and "nonrace cases." Repudiating color­
blind lawyering does not mean making race the primary focus of 
every case, but it does require a thorough and honest response 
when race is articulated as even arguably an influence. 
In sum, then, an ideology of colorblind lawyering has the poten­
tial to exacerbate further the professional and personal predica­
ment of the Black attorney, whose everyday experiences as a 
lawyer underscore the reminder that issues of race matter enor­
mously. This phenomenon may consign the attorney to the adop­
tion of legal categories and strategies not reflective of the 
paradoxical nature of her role, which in turn may engender criti­
cisms that the lawyer has simply abandoned or sold out Black com­
munity concerns. To conclude that a particular Black attorney in 
such a situation is a sellout or mere assimilationist - without ad­
dressing the insidiousness of the underlying welter of constraints -
is to ignore the asphyxiating conditions in which many Black attor­
neys must pursue their careers. 
C. The Cochran Conundrum: Accusations of Playing the Race 
Card and the Perils of Race-Conscious Lawyering 
If the Darden Dilemma may be reinterpreted to describe one 
set of constraints imposed upon Black attorneys, I use the term 
Cochran Conundrum to characterize another set of obstacles, en­
countered most frequently by Black lawyers who openly articulate 
issues of racism as relevant to a particular case. The name - de­
rived, of course, from mainstream public and media reaction to 
Johnnie Cochran's explicitly race-based arguments in the Simpson 
case59 - is meant to suggest that certain elements of the vehement 
59. See, e.g., Joseph Demma & Shirley E. Perlman, Wrangling over "Race Card," NEWS­
DAY, Jan. 14, 1995, at A7, available in LEXIS, News Library, NEWSDY file; Bill Maxwell, 
Intraracism Snares Chris Darden, Aruz. REPUBLIC, Oct. 25, 1995, at BS, available in 1995 WL 
2840305 ("The truth is that, along with using race as a blunt instrument against whites, blacks 
use it to craft relations with one another . • . . [T]he defense, led by the brilliant Johnnie 
Cochran, played the intrarace card . . . .  "); Joseph Wambaugh, Perspective on the Simpson 
Case; The Race Card, from Bottom of Deck, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 24, 1995, at B9 (calling 
Cochran's allegations of racism in public perceptions of the case "black racism" and conclud· 
ing that "Johnnie Cochran has not only played the race card, he's dealt it from the bottom of 
the deck"). For an example of the ironic use of race-card terminology to criticize anti-Black 
attitudes, see Anthony Lewis, Trust Gone Bust in a Divided America, HousTON CHRoN., 
Oct. 9, 1995, at 22, available in 1995 WL 9408020 ("Even before the verdict some politicians 
and intellectuals were playing the race card to whites, arguing that blacks were too demand· 
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criticism directed against Cochran are representative of the disap­
proval faced by lawyers who implement race-conscious strategies in 
client representation. The current manifestation of this deep-seated 
disdain is the accusation that one is "playing the race card" and 
therefore unfairly skewing reasonable debate on the "merits" of a 
case by insisting that racism is a relevant issue in an otherwise race­
less context.60 
Although the genesis of the phrase "playing the race card" pre­
cedes the Simpson case, the term has achieved widespread usage 
through its frequent invocation in public discourse during and now 
after the trial to describe and deride various aspects of the Simpson 
defense-team strategy. Christopher Darden himself introduced the 
phrase into the trial proceedings at an early stage in rebutting 
Cochran's claim that Darden had been added to the prosecution 
team "just to show that if a black prosecutor sees O.J. guilty, he is 
being judged by the evidence at hand and not for some deep-seated 
bias."61 At another odd juncture, Darden advanced the race-card 
accusation when he and Cochran bickered over Darden's attempt 
to ask a witness whether he had described a certain person's voice 
as "sound[ing] like the voice of a Black man."62 And, as noted 
above, Darden argued that Cochran was playing the race card in 
ing. The greater danger of the Simpson verdict and the reactions to it is that the white major­
ity will tum even further against measures to ameliorate inequalities of opportunity."). 
60. Interestingly, there is rarely discussion of what exactly the phrase "playing the race 
card" means in any individual context, although the accusation is often lodged with a casual­
ness suggestive of an insider's "shorthand" - as though the reader will of course understand 
the author's meaning. In response, one might usefully invoke Angela Davis's blunt re­
minder: "Race is not a card." See Henry Louis Gates, Jr., Thirteen Ways of Looking at a 
Black Man, NEW YORI<ER, Oct. 23, 1995, at 56, 59. In an editorial assessing the closing 
arguments in the case, the New York Times offered some detail to its invocation of the 
criticism: 
Mr. Cochran, showing the knack for the theatrics that successful trial lawyers need, 
argued forcibly and fairly that the racism and perjury on the part of former Los Angeles 
detective Mark Fuhrman cast doubt on Mr. Fuhrman's credibility and justified skepti­
cism about some evidence. But he crossed a line when he urged the jury to look beyond 
the specifics of the O.J. case and send a broader message that would help "police the 
police" everywhere and stop further misbehavior by racist cops. 
This was playing the race card with irresponsible sweep and remarkable viciousness. 
Race Cards and Rebuttals, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1995, at 18 (editorial). 
61. Maxwell, supra note 59. 
62. For a transcript of this exchange as covered by the Cable News Network, see Testi­
mony of Robert Heidstra, Cable News Network, Transcript #110-4, July 12, 1995, available in 
LEXIS, News Library, Script File. In a particularly unfortunate colloquy, Cochran insisted 
that Darden's question itself was "racist": "You can't tell by listening to someone whether 
they're black [or] white . . . •  I think it's totally improper in America at this time in 1995 just to 
hear this and endure this." Annette Kornblum, ls Race-Tagging a Voice Talkin' Trash or 
Truth? What Science Says About Speech and Stereotypes, WASH. PosT, July 23, 1995, at CJ 
(quoting Cochran and discussing ebonies, the linguistic study of "Black English," including 
the sound, inflection, rhythm, and pitch of its various colloquial dialects). 
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seeking to introduce into evidence Mark Fuhrman's use of the word 
"nigger. "63 
Although Darden's early and uninhibited use of the race-card 
trope in court did much to encourage its usage in public and media 
commentary, the saying attracted the most attention and acquired 
an almost talismanic significance when uttered by Robert Shapiro, 
Cochran's co-counsel, in a television interview shortly after the ver­
dict. Shapiro, who is white, publicly and emphatically disavowed 
what he suggested was a manipulative and inappropriate use of race 
in his own co-counsel's defense strategy. Shapiro singled out 
Cochran with particular ire for including in his closing arguments 
rhetorical references to Hitler and the Holocaust in castigating the 
Los Angeles Police Department's failure to address the racist be­
havior of Mark Fuhrman. Shapiro asserted: "My position was al­
ways the same, that race would not and should not be a part of this 
case. I was wrong. Not only did we play the race card, we dealt it 
from the bottom of the deck."64 
As emphasized from the outset, my focus is neither the sub­
stance of the Simpson prosecution itself nor the relative merits of 
individual lawyering strategies in the context of that case. One may 
legitimately view Cochran or Darden as a hero, foe, or pawn; one 
may legitimately view the now undisputed racism of Fuhrman as a 
controlling, major, or minor factor in the ultimate merits of the 
prosecution's case. But, I contend, the vituperation with which 
Cochran was labeled as, for example, an "oleaginous"65 shyster who 
"shamelessly and shamefully stoked fires of racial animosity in the 
attempt to get his client off"66 reveals far more than an individual­
ized assessment of Cochran's capabilities as a lawyer. Outside the 
context of race - that is, both Cochran's and his client Simpson's 
race - Cochran's strategy might have been evaluated by his critics 
in more conventional terms as a zealous defense attorney's claim 
that the bias of a key prosecution witness was a highly relevant fac­
tor in assessing the prosecution's case; but because race - espe­
cially Cochran's race - powerfully affected public perceptions of 
his lawyering role, he became responsible for representing race it-
63. See Noble, supra note 58. 
64. Staples, supra note 56. 
65. See Joan Beck, It's Boiling Down to Race - Again; the Nation Has Had Enough of 
Trying to Stomach OJ. "the Victim," CHICAGO TRIB., Oct. 15, 1995, at 21. 
66. Taki Theadoracopoulos, DJ's Lawyers Play the Race-Hate Card, THE TIMES 
(London), Mar. 19, 1995, at 11. 
February 1997] Black Attorneys 791 
self.67 Thus, one commentator in essence blamed Cochran for the 
nation's continuing racial tensions: 
Were it not for the call by Simpson's black lawyer to the predomi­
nantly black jury to remember "you're the ones at war" against the 
racist whit� P<?lice - blatantly urging jurors to ignore the evidence of 
murder and to get even for society's past injustices - then the coun­
try quickly could have healed its' wound.68 
In my view, such venomous criticism is rooted in part in the sus­
picion and mistrust to which Black attorneys are subjected more 
broadly. Cochran had not only engaged in what his critics consid­
ered to be inappropriate advocacy; he had also violated a social ta­
boo by rendering painfully explicit the racial overtones that had 
suffused the case from its inception. The angry, contemptuous na­
ture of the playing-the-race-card accusation - lodged against the 
Simpson defense team generally but with particular scorn and fe­
rocity against Cochran - epitomizes the resistance and even cen­
sure encountered by attorneys who use individual cases to pose 
broad critiques against systemic and institutional racism. When the 
"card-playing" attorneys happen to be Black, the hostility is com­
pounded by underlying assumptions that of course Blacks cannot be 
trusted to "play fair" or to act responsibly with respect to issues of 
race. Thus, an explicit strategic decision to employ race-based ad­
vocacy is evaluated not only on professional terms but on deeply 
visceral ones. Such a decision runs the risk of being lambasted as 
whining, pandering, trickery, demagoguery, or manipulation; the 
advocate, in turn, must be prepared to be viewed in the lowest pos­
sible regard - even for a lawyer, or for a defense lawyer ·at that. 
It is difficult to ignore the connections between context-specific 
invocations of the race-card accusation and the far-reaching animus 
with which explicitly antiracist, race-conscious critiques are met in a 
67. For the viewpoint that Cochran's courtroom strategy was "applied critical race the­
ory," see Jeffrey Rosen, The Bloods and the Crits, THE NEW REPUBUC, Dec. 9, 1996, at 27 
("[S]urely the most striking example of the influence of the critical race theorists on the 
American legal system is the OJ. Simpson case, in which Johnnie L. Cochran dramatically 
enacted each of the most controversial postulates of the movement before a transfixed and 
racially divided nation."). In my view, Rosen's assertion is highly questionable in at least two 
of its implicit assumptions: (1) that Cochran, a veteran defense attorney whose courtroom 
style and strategic sense are the products of decades of litigation, was influenced in any sig­
nificant sense during the Simpson trial by the writings of critical race theorists; and (2) that 
Cochran's courtroom strategy exemplifies tenets of critical race theory any more than, say, 
pragmatic criminal defense representation. Rather, I contend, the "striking," "dramatic," 
and "controversial" characteristics to which Rosen refers stem at least as much from specta­
tors' reaction to Cochran as a forceful and persuasive Black male advocate as from the puta­
tive novelty of his arguments. 
68. William Satire, After the Aftermath: Damage Done, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Oct. 13, 
1995, at Al9, available in 1995 WL 6556856. 
792 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 95:766 
variety of contexts.69 Like the proliferation of charges of "political 
correctness" in academic and popular discourse in the early 1990s,7o 
the increasingly widespread and cynical iteration of playing the race 
card today substitutes mockery and trivialization for thoughtful re­
action and response. Ironically but perhaps not so unintentionally, 
such pejorative denunciations themselves function as trumps by im­
pugning not just the comments but the very integrity of the "race­
talking" advocate; the not-so-subtle implication is that talking 
about race has turned into a matter of sophistry, gamesmanship, 
and hyperbole. The intolerance conveyed by such an accusation 
serves a policing function by warning the would-be race-card trans­
gressor that his or her complaints of racism will be interpreted as 
irrelevant, self-serving, and maliciously advanced. 
What, then, are the implications of the Cochran Conundrum for 
the Black lawyer who attempts to raise issues of race in a legal pro­
ceeding? As noted above, one primary concern is the likelihood 
that one's very integrity and credibility will be called into question 
to a degree that white colleagues do not experience; like Black 
judges who have suffered the insults of motions for disqualification 
filed simply because they are Black judges in "race" cases, the 
Black lawyer will be presumed incompetent to meet the ethical de­
mands of her professional - albeit advocacy, rather than judicial 
- role. This presumption renders race-conscious lawyering a Sisy­
phean task: the Black lawyer must - again and again - monitor 
and evaluate the effects of her own racial identity on decision­
makers' perceptions of the race-conscious strategies employed. 
A second and more daunting effect of the Cochran Conundrum, 
however, is the deleterious impact that it may exert on the develop­
ment of creative, progressive, and radical lawyering strategies and 
critiques. Like all innovations, race-conscious lawyering will have a 
chance to develop only if lawyers are given the latitude to theorize 
about the connections between individual cases and a broader soci-
69. See, for example, Peter Collier and David Horowitz's castigation of Today show host 
Bryant Gumbel and actor Laurence Fishburne for complaining about Hollywood racism: 
It was quite a spectacle. Here were two men making millions of dollars as African­
American megastars, complaining about the white conspiracy to deny them success . . • .  
Deploring the unreformable reality of American racism has become a ritual for Afri­
can-American celebrities, almost like presenting an apartheid pass in order to retain 
their status in the community, even when their life experiences argue the exact opposite. 
Peter Collier & David Horowitz, Hollywood's "Racism" Not So Black and White, S.F. EXAM­
INER, Sept 19, 1993, at D3, available in 1993 WL 8588751. 
70. For an overview of the "political correctness" debate and its implications, see gener­
ally DEBATING P.C.: THE CoNTROVERSY OVER POLITICAL CORRECTNESS ON COLLEGE 
CAMPUSES (Paul Berman ed., 1992); TODD GITUN, THE TWILIOIIT OF COMMON DREAMS: 
WHY AMERICA Is WRACKED BY CULTURE WARS (1995). 
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etal framework of racial hierarchy.71 Given the current climate of 
resistance to such approaches, fewer and fewer advocates will 
choose to suffer the repercussions of being accused of playing the 
race card. 
IV. CONCLUSION: ESCAPING THE STRAITJACKET 
Perhaps the most unfortunate aspect of the heavily emphasized 
intrarace conflict between Cochran and Darden - and the 
metanarrative of "Black versus Black" animus upon which it 
seemed to capitalize - was the extent to which it neglected to ad­
dress the preconstructed nature of their differences. Although 
Cochran and Darden, to be sure, embody different generational 
perspectives on and strategic approaches to their conceptions of 
what it means to be a Black attorney, their conflict was constructed 
in the sense that it was structured and influenced by racial attitudes 
and assumptions beyond their understanding and control. More­
over, it was worsened by the dominant gaze of media frenzy,72 espe­
cially the omnipresent voyeurism induced by cameras in the 
courtroom. At times, lamentably, both attorneys seemed to fuel 
this metanarrative of intraracial hostility by reserving their most an­
tagonistic courtroom battles for racially charged conflicts with each 
other.73 Within the limited parameters of adversarial combat over 
the fate of O.J. Simpson and the tragically lost lives of Nicole 
Brown Simpson and Ronald Goldman, each attorney invoked -
arguably necessarily - choices of lawyering strategy destined to pit 
one against the other on issues of race. These issues transcended -
perhaps equally necessarily - the particulars of the case and con­
tributed to the transformation of Cochran and Darden into compet­
ing symbols of Black legal professionalism. 
71. Integral to the race-conscious critical project is the exploration of gender and sexual­
orientation hierarchies, as well as racial and color hierarchies. Certainly, important gender 
issues (especially domestic violence) were deliberately and strategically subordinated in the 
race-conscious lawyering of the Simpson defense team. 
72. See Margaret M. Russell, Race and the Dominant Gaze: Narratives of Law and Ine­
quality in Popular Film, 15 LEGAL Srun. F. 243, 244 (1991) (using feminist theorist Laura 
Mulvey's critique of the "male gaze" to describe the "dominant gaze" of media, which tends 
"to objectify and trivialize the racial identity and experiences of people of color, even when it 
purports to represent them"). 
73. Sadly, at times these showdowns assumed a stagy, almost circus-like quality. For ex­
ample, in their heated courtroom exchange over the admissibility of Fuhrrnan's use of racial 
epithets, Cochran turned to address Darden directly and chided: "I'm ashamed for Mr. 
Darden to allow himself to become an apologist for this man." Noble, supra note 58. 
Darden was equally churlish toward Cochran throughout the trial, at one point turning to 
him to assert: "That's what has created a lot of problems for my family and myself, state­
ments that you make about me and race." Simmering Ito Boils After Bickering, ST. PETERS­
BURG TIMES, July 13, 1995, at Al. 
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Recognition of and resistance to the construction and accentua­
tion of intraracial conflict is critically important in seeking to pre­
serve relationships not only among Black lawyers, but also between 
those lawyers and Black communities. Racial hierarchy is well 
served by microcosmic patterns of seemingly idiosyncratic spats and 
divisions among Black attorneys. As long as Black attorneys and 
their communities fritter away precious energy and resources en­
gaging in personal sniping, we will have few opportunities to chal­
lenge the broader framework of legal dysfunction that encompasses 
us all. 
As argued above, erroneous constructions and false dichotomies 
deprive Black attorneys who seek to serve their communities of 
critically needed latitude; because of the straitjacketing effects of 
contemporary legal practice, Black attorneys have not even begun 
to have the opportunity to explore difficult questions of legal pro­
fessionalism, ethics, community identification, race-conscious 
lawyering strategies, or political agenda formation.74 Moving be­
yond the false dichotomies requires the realization that they serve 
the regressive purpose of miring Black lawyers and their communi­
ties in self-hatred and disrespect; such dichotomies must be sup­
planted by broader visions of lawyering than the narrow 
constructions that exist today. This is indeed a daunting task, but, 
as Judge Higginbotham suggested a generation ago, Black attorneys 
have always had to shoulder the burdens of representing race in 
more ways than one. 
74. For a persuasive argument that mainstream legal education should shoulder at least 
some responsibility for fostering these debates for the benefit of Black law students planning 
to enter the corporate sector, see generally Wilkins, supra note 18. 
